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HOFSTRA JAW REVIEW
Volume 6, No. 3, Part II

Spring 1978

INTRODUCTION:
A PROFESSIONAL AGENDA
Andrew L. Kaufman*
It was a pleasure to be asked to write the introduction to this
Symposium on Professional Responsibility in honor of my friend

and former classmate Monroe H. Freedman. He deserves it. Wittingly, and unwittingly, he has done much for the cause of professional responsibility. Like most of us who teach and write in this
2
area, he came to it by chance. The story of his speech' and article

in the mid-1960's that led to a hearing to consider disciplinary pro-

ceedings has been referred to by others in this issue and need not
be repeated. 3 For long years, except for a flurry of interest in the
early 1950's prompted by the writing of that interesting maverick,
Charles P. Curtis, 4 the field of professional responsibility had lain

fallow. Only the Warren Court had been active in the field, and its
focus was on removing professional obstacles to increasing the
5
availability of legal services to lower-income groups.

The controversy surrounding Professor Freedman's speech and
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. A.B., 1951; LL.B., 1954, Harvard Uni-

versity.
1. Lecture by Monroe H. Freedman, Criminal Trial Institute, Washington, D.C.

(1966).
2. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1469 n.1 (1966).
3. Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking the
Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 671-76 (1978); Selinger, The
Perry Mason Perspectiveand Others: A Critique of Reductionist Thinking About the
Ethics of Untruthful Practices by Lawyers for "Innocent" Defendants, 6 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 631, 632-38 (1978).
4. See Curtis, Ethics in the Law, 4 STAN. L. BEv. 477 (1952); Curtis, The Ethics
of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1951).
5. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United
Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963).
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article renewed interest in lawyers' problems. In its early phases,
the discussion was largely in academic circles and centered on
specific problems arising out of the obligation of confidentiality.
Even the redrafting of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
(the Code), which proceeded almost unnoticed in the years between 1964 and 1969, and its subsequent adoption by the states,
failed to awaken an interest in more general problems of professional responsibility. The Code was not regarded by lawyers as affecting their individual lives very much.
Lawyers' involvement in Watergate changed all this. For the
public, it dramatized not only problems of professional responsibility but also the way the profession was carrying out its obligations.
Rightly or wrongly, sometimes one, sometimes the other, the profession was often portrayed publicly in the villain's role. For the
profession, Watergate became the occasion for introspection and for
discussion of problems that had long existed. Even the law schools
became interested, to some extent. The focus of the new interest
in professional responsibility problems has become more generalized and now extends to matters of access to legal services and to
virtually all aspects of the way lawyers do their work. General practitioners, business and "public interest" lawyers, academics, the
SEC, Congress, and the Supreme Court, not to mention sociologists, philosophers, and historians, have become sensitized to the
profession's problems and have analyzed its resources. It has become a time for reexamination of generalizations, premises, and the
structure of the profession. Many within and without the profession
think that the time has come to reformulate its governing rules and
ideals, and indeed the American Bar Association has appointed a
diverse group of lawyers to rewrite the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility. The subject matter of the articles in this Symposium
presents, in a general way, a partial agenda of the problems that the
activity of the last dozen years has produced for the legal profession,
and others, to solve. The purpose of this introduction is to add a few
more items to that agenda.
I.

THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Obligation to Undertake Representation
One major problem is to adjust the relationship between lawyers and clients. That relationship has two aspects: One is the nature of the obligation of the profession and of the individual lawyer
to represent all comers; the second is the extent to which a lawyer
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should be obligated to achieve particular client ends or to use particular means when neither the ends nor the means are unlawful,
but the lawyer finds them "unconscionable," or "morally reprehensible," to use the two terms in current vogue.
The legal profession in this country has not accepted the "taxicab rule" of British barristers under which it would be unprofessional to refuse to take on a client for any reason relating to the nature of the client or his or her cause. Although our governing rules
state a general duty of the profession to see that unpopular clients
get representation, 6 there is nevertheless a fair amount of leeway
for individual lawyers to decline to represent particular clients and
causes on the basis of personal predilection. The uneasy balance
between choice and obligation has been coming under increased
pressure lately as some segments of the public and even of the
profession seek to hold lawyers more accountable for their clients'
ends and means, especially in the noncriminal and nonlitigation
part of practice. This pressure is reinforced somewhat by developments in conflict-of-interest law that are making it more difficult for
law firms to represent a wide variety of interests and that may
result in associating firms with particular sides of issues even more
closely, in the public view if not in fact. A new look at that balance
is an important item on the professional agenda.

Client Objectives and the Lawyer's Conscience
The problems do not cease with the decision to undertake representation. For a very long time, there have been two threads in
the ethics of the profession, one emphasizing the lawyer's duties to
society and the other emphasizing his or her duty to a particular client. Canon 15 of the former ABA Canons of Professional Ethics (the
Canons) intermingled both duties. It began by proclaiming:
Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence
which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the
false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do
whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's
cause. 7
6. See ABA CODE. OF PROFESSIONAL
(1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
7.

RESPONSIBILITY

Canon 2 & EC 2-27

ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 15.
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With a break to announce that a lawyer should keep silent
about personal belief in a client's innocence or the justice of his or
her cause, the canon then stated the opposing thread:
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end
that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules
of law, legally applied. . . . In the judicial forum the client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense."
To make certain, however, that the duty to society was not
understood as being overborne by the requirement of zeal on behalf of the client, the canon then concluded where it began:
But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of
the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds
of the law. The office of atttorney does not permit, much less
does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his own conscience
9
and not that of his client.
Canon 15 contained strong statements of the duties to both
client and court. When these duties seemed to conflict, one could
not draw comfort from the general language of the Canons about
the preeminence of either.1 0 Except in a few cases, there was no
specific language to resolve this difficult question. Lawyers had to
choose one path or the other as best they could.
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility adopts a somewhat different philosophy. Its great length, as compared to the Canons, assures that it covers a great many more subjects. Its format,
the division between disciplinary rules and ethical considerations,
was a largely unsuccessful effort1 1 to set forth minimum enforceable
standards for some specific situations and then aspirational goals for
those and a number of other situations. In the process, however,
more than the rhetoric of obligation disappeared. The former balanced statement of duties became obscured to the point where

8.
9.
10.
11.
(1976).

Id.
Id.
See also id. No. 32.
See A. KAUFMAN,

PROBLEMS IN

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
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many thoughtful commentators have concluded that a new order
has been created.12
By chance or design, the drafters of the Code found it possible
and desirable to state the lawyer's obligation with respect to client
objectives in the disciplinary rules. The obligation to represent a
client zealously is stated cogently and broadly in DR 7-101(A): "A
lawyer shall not intentionally: (1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives
of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law
and the Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101(B)."' 13
The exceptions stated later in the provision all relate to matters of
etiquette. Relying heavily on this rule and on the restrictive nature
of the rules relating to withdrawal from representation,' 4 some
commentators have concluded that a lawyer who has undertaken
representation is required in the litigation context, and to a large
extent in the nonlitigation context, to seek to achieve all the
client's objectives by reasonably available means, the only restriction being that nothing "unlawful" is perpetrated.15
The lawyer's societal obligations in these matters, on the other
hand, are not contained in the disciplinary rules but are scattered
throughout the ethical considerations. One must look very hard in
the present Code to find language comparable to that in former
canon 15 telling the lawyer to avoid "chicane" and to "obey his
own conscience."l6 But it is there, albeit not so clearly as it was in
canon 15. EC 7-8 tells the lawyer that in a nonadjudicatory matter
he or she may withdraw if the client "insists upon a course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but
not prohibited by Disciplinary Rules."' 17 More importantly, buried
in EC 1-5 is the statement that a lawyer "should refrain from all
8
illegal and morally reprehensible conduct."
It is difficult to know what the committee that drafted the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility had in mind with respect
to the balance of duties that was stated in former canon 15. Many
12. See, e.g., Bellow & Kettleson, The Mirror of Public Interest Ethics: Problems and Paradoxes, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GUJIDE FOR ATTORNEYS

219, 258-65 (1978); Schwartz, The Missing Role of Professional Conduct, 52 L.A.B.J.
10, 11-12, 15 (1976).
13. ABA CODE, supra note 6, DR 7-101(A) (footnotes omitted).

14.
15.

See id. DR 2-110.
See authorities cited note 12 supra.

16.
17.

See text accompanying note 9 supra.
ABA CODE, supra note 6, EC 7-8.

18. Id. EC 1-5 (footnote omitted).
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courts that have dealt with problems of professional responsibility
in recent years state quite clearly that there are still strong conflicting duties that must be reconciled in specific situations.' 9 High on
the agenda of the new committee that is studying the Code ought
to be a restatement of these duties, hopefully one that recognizes
the importance of both, and also provides more guidance about the
factors that ought to enter into resolution of the conflict in particular cases.

II. DISCRETION
In looking at possible accommodations in problems concerning
lawyers' duties to clients, another major problem appears. One approach is to tell lawyers quite precisely what their obligations to
prospective and current clients are. Such an approach, however,
may pressure a lawyer to act in a way that he or she regards as "immoral." It is one thing for a lawyer to defend a client believed or
even known to be guilty of a heinous offense against criminal
charges brought by the state. It is quite another, at least for many,
to be told that one must, under pain of disciplinary action, assist a
"hate group" to incorporate; or assist a business to produce a
dangerous but not outlawed product if that "group" or business is
"unpopular" and unlikely to be able to find satisfactory representation; or assist a client to achieve an unjust but lawful solution to a
dispute when the client desires it.
Such pressure has already contributed to the unwillingness of
many lawyers to participate in the criminal process, although some
see that situation as an argument against allowing lawyers freedom
in choice of representation. But a more thoroughgoing pressure
that forced lawyers to act against their consciences too often might
well change the profile of the profession by forcing out the most sensitive practitioners. A wide discretion, on the other hand, will increase the number of situations in which the choice of lawyer may
be crucial to attainment of a client's "lawful" objectives and will
also tend to increase the public association of lawyers and clients.
The same problem of narrow versus wide discretion exists with respect to those situations where breach of a client's confidences may
be in order. A primary item on the professional agenda is analysis
19.

See, e.g., People v. Belge, 50 App. Div. 2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th

Dep't 1975), affd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 337, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976); In re A,
276 Ore. 225, 554 P.2d 479 (1976).
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of different situations to mark out those where more precision is
20
required from those where substantial discretion seems advisable.
III.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The most litigated questions of professional responsibility at
present are those involving conflict of interest. Although conflict
issues, unlike so many others, are publicly visible, their preeminence in litigation is doubtless due, at least in part, to the strategic
consideration of getting opposing counsel disqualified. The presence of that motive should not, however, detract from the importance of the problem. It involves, at one level of abstraction, our
view of the appropriate adversariness of the legal system and, at a
different level, an accommodation between the desire to lower
legal costs, both generally and to particular clients, and our notions
of the loyalty and independent judgment to which a client is entitled. While it has been suggested that the present rules are designed largely to further the profession's self-interest in providing
more work for lawyers, 21 my instinct is that to the extent professional self-interest is a factor, it works more in the opposite direction. Lawyers hate to send a client elsewhere and very often will
attempt to represent differing interests when they should not. At
the very least, this is another of those situations where it is difficult
to ascribe a professional rule to individual self-interest. Depending
on the content one gives that phrase, self-interest is in both scales.
There are two conflict-of-interest issues that should concern
the profession. The obvious one is substantive resolution; the second is the impression that many students have that the level of
professional sensitivity in this matter is amazingly low. One would
like to think that these questions are inextricably intertwined, that
the present rule would work well if only lawyers were more educated to its nuances. To some extent they are intertwined, but financial pressures work against the educational process to affect
lawyers' decisions in this area probably as much or more than in
any other.
The progression from the old Canons to the present Code has
been in the direction of a greater tilt away from representation of
20.

For further discussion of such discretion, see Frankel, Book Review, 43 U.

CHI. L. REv. 874, 877-82 (1976) (ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1975)).
See also A. KAUFMAN, supra note 11, at 613-15.

21. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARv. L. REv. 702, 727-28 (1977).
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multiple interests when there is doubt. One recent effort, the
proposal of the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia
Bar with regard to former government lawyers and the "revolving
door," has even eschewed sole reliance on general rules in favor of
some mechanical, temporal restrictions on employment. 22 On the
other hand, with more interest and litigation has come more
sophisticated analysis of the various factors that go into conflict-ofinterest decisions, thus increasing pressure for balancing these factors on an even more ad hoe basis, and providing, incidentally,
23
greater discretion for lawyers.
A subsidiary issue is whether the recognition of "public interest" considerations that has played such an important role in
devising the much disputed "screening off" rules for the former
government lawyer should carry over into other areas of conflictof-interest law. One typical situation arises when the current rules
are read to deny a legal aid office with several branches the ability
to represent, say, both the indigent husband and wife in a divorce
matter. The likely result is that one party will have no representation at all. 24 Another situation arises when a law firm member does
work for, or sits on the board of, certain kinds of legal service offices. A too literal application of current conflict-of-interest rules
might stifle that promising relationship.2 5
Finally, even if the current rules are thought to be just right,
there are two other problems to which attention should be given:
the adequacy of the current rules about the nature of disclosures
that should be made by a lawyer seeking consent to multiple representation and the effect of seeking consent itself. One does get
the impression sometimes that the disclosures made are very
sketchy and that a form of words, with some examples, ought to be

22. These proposals are reprinted in
23.

DISTRICT LAW., Winter 1977, at 46.
See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d

751 (2d Cir. 1975); THE COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, ASSOCIA-

TION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, OPINIONS, No. 889 (1976), reprinted
in 31 REc. A.B. CITY NEW YORK 552 (1976).
24. Compare COMM. ON ETHICS, BOSTON BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS, No.
76-2 (1976) (permitting such representation under certain conditions) with Borden v.
Borden, 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. 1971) (forbidding such representation); compare ABA
COMM. ON ETHICS AND. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No.

1233 (1972) (operation of Indian reservation legal aid office) with id. No. 1235 (operation of Coast Guard legal aid office).
25. See generally Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
Compare Barnett, Book Review, 90 HARv. L. REv. 648, 654-56 (1977) with Kaufman,
The Lawyers' New Code, HARv. L. SCH. BULL., October 1970, at 19.
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found that will inform lawyers more fully of their responsibilities in
that regard.
The consent issue is more serious. Consent is not always the
easy, obvious solution to a conflict problem. In many cases, it is
simply a way of shifting a conflict problem from the lawyer to the
client. Worse than that, the situation may be such, or appear to
the client to be such, that consciously or unconsciously the'cient is
coerced to consent. A client who has invested time and money in a
relationship with a lawyer may be unwilling to jeopardize that relationship by refusing to grant permission to his or her lawyer to reprepent a client with a differing interest. Somehow the problem of the
coercion that may be involved in seeking consent must be brought
26
more into the forefront of lawyers' consciousness.
IV.

PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES

Another large issue on the profession's agenda is the proper
stance to be taken toward the provision of legal services to the
populace at large. The existence, nature, and extent of unmet legal
needs have been debated and investigated for some time, and a
27
recent study has developed a good deal of data on the subject.
The amount of society's resources that ought to be spent on the
provision of legal services is also a matter of current governmental
interest, especially in connection with annual appropriations for the
National Legal Services Corporation. But attention has begun to
focus on the specific nature of an individual lawyer's obligations,
and the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice of the
American Bar Association has recommended that a specific quantified obligation be required in public interest work, as that term is
defined by that committee.2 8 The clash of "public interests" involved-the "service" as opposed to its "compelled" nature and infringement on a lawyer's "personal liberty"-assures that the battle
over this issue, which has surfaced on the profession's agenda so
recently, will be heated.
Attention has also begun to focus on the judicial system itself,
26. For a good discussion of current conflict problems, see Fordham, Limitations on Representation of Clients in Litigation, 33 Bus. LAW. 1193 (Special Issue
Mar. 1978). Many other issues of professional responsibility are discussed in other
articles in this special issue of The Business Lawyer.
27. See B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT
OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (1977).
28. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE, IMPLEMENTING
THE LAWYER'S PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE OBLIGATION (1977).
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and some suggest that part of the solution to society's legal needs
may well be found in creating structures outside the legal system. 9
The problems posed by these proposals and the relation of such
structures to the legal profession are only just beginning to be
explored, but the suggestions are bound to receive serious consideration in the future, especially if the judicial system does not succeed in resolving its own administrative problems better than it has
in the recent past. These are also important items for our professional agenda.
V.

COMPETENCE

The past ten years have seen growing interest in the profession in that category of issues subsumed under the heading of
competence, including competence as related to admission, and
especially as related to discipline and to specialization. Professor
Cohen's provocative article30 in this Symposium raises a number of
the issues. The great problem is to achieve a satisfactory accommodation between the achievement of the democratic ideals that
ought to govern not only admission to the profession but also the
way in which the profession provides lawyers who can relate to the
legal problems of the great masses of the American people and the
achievement of sufficiently high standards of competence to handle
the increasingly more technical requirements of a corporate regulatory state. "Elitism" is a dirty word in democratic circles, and
there is no doubt that prejudice has played, and still plays, a role
in the professional hierarchy. But "elitism" in its striving for quality
work is the essence of professionalism, and critics should avoid
slipping into a too easy equation of high standards with a cover for
exclusiveness and prejudice.
The law schools themselves have been struggling with the
same problem not only at the admissions level but also in the expectations of achievement that they set as goals for students. If it is
true that the new emphasis on humaneness, rapport, and popularity in the classroom has been accompanied by lowered expectations
of student achievement, if it is true that most second-year and
third-year students do not work on academic subjects as hard as
they must to achieve an understanding of the subject matter, then
29. See, e.g., ABA, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINOR DisPUTES RESOLUTION 11-20 (1978).
30. Cohen, Certification of Trial Lawyers-The Judicious Structuring of thw
American Legal Profession, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 793 (1978).
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that is a condition the law schools need to remedy. One recent
suggestion for academic malaise-shortening law school to two
years-seems counterproductive. The substantive law foundations
for a lawyer's whole career, including a sense of the mission of law,
are laid in law school. Students need more education, not less, to
prepare them to serve the public properly.
A new appreciation seems to be emerging in the law schools of
the necessity to provide a balance in the curriculum among the
study of legal doctrine, study of its connections with everything
else that is going on in society, study of legal theory, and study of
the practical problems faced by lawyers and the profession. But the
best curriculum will fail if it is not taught with a sense of confidence in its purpose. That sense, both in the law schools and in
the profession itself, seems to be faltering at the present moment.
The profession is on the defensive. Indeed, there are some who are
suggesting that society would be best served if there were no legal
profession at all. That is an old cry, but it is being heard somewhat
more insistently today, backed by a good deal of mea culpa and
self-criticism from within the profession itself, at all levels, including Justices of the Supreme Court. In such an atmosphere, law can
be taught and practiced with satisfaction only by those whose study
and contemplation has left them with a confident feeling of the
utility of what they are doing. That confident feeling must be justified by service, and by service beyond that for which payment is
received. Acceptance of that obligation is all that entitles lawyers to
be invested with the title and benefits of a profession. If the title is
justified, at least in substantial part, and I am one of those who
thinks it is, then even though we see large room for improvement
-and where is there not in human affairs?-we should not be so
defensive about what we are doing. Perhaps a renewal of confidence
should be the number one item on the profession's agenda.
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